fix(auth): make logout revoke, and keep the JWT out of the URL - #72

The two identity findings that had been open since the first audit round.

Logout did not log anyone out

POST /auth/logout deleted the cookie and returned {"status": "ok"}. A refresh token copied out of the browser — which is the only scenario where logging out matters — stayed valid for its full seven days. The endpoint was a no-op against exactly the person it existed to stop.

A JWT cannot be withdrawn once issued, so each refresh token now carries the ver it was minted under, and GitHubUser.token_version is bumped on logout. Cheaper than a denylist: nothing stored per token, nothing to expire, no cleanup job.

Two consequences worth agreeing on before merge:

1. It logs the user out everywhere, not just in this browser. For a tool holding a GitHub OAuth token and a Claude subscription credential, that is what someone clicking logout after losing a laptop expects. A per-session jti denylist would be narrower, at the cost of a table and an expiry job.
2. Tokens issued before this migration are rejected, since they carry no ver claim — current users get logged out once on deploy. That is the intent rather than a side effect: the point is that tokens minted under the old rules stop being honoured.

POST /auth/logout is authenticated now, because revocation has to know whose tokens to invalidate.

The access token was in the redirect URL

RedirectResponse(url=f"{settings.APP_BASE_URL}/auth/callback?access_token={tokens.access_token}")

That URL lands in browser history, in the Referer of whatever the page loads next, and in every proxy log between the two — carrying the credential that authenticates the whole API.

The redirect carries no token now. It sets the httpOnly refresh cookie, and the frontend trades that for an access token by calling POST /auth/refresh — through refreshToken(), which the API client already had for silent renewal and which is now exported rather than re-implemented in the callback.

OAuthCallback.tsx no longer reads useSearchParams at all, which is the property the new test pins: the token can only come from the cookie exchange.

Verification

• 426 backend tests (was 422) and 66 frontend tests; ruff, ruff format, mypy, tsc --noEmit and eslint all clean
• New backend coverage: a token issued before logout is rejected, a token with no ver claim is rejected, a freshly issued one still works after revocation, logout is 401 without auth, logout increments the version
• The callback test asserts the redirect has no access_token= and does set the refresh cookie
• Migration 5b500a24f018 autogenerated against a real Postgres and applied over the full chain

Note

docs/self-hosting.md needs no change — nothing there documented the callback's query string. CLAUDE.md gained both invariants.